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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RUTH

~IARIE

BASINGER,
Plaintiff and Appellant.
vs.
STANDARD FURNITURE CO~f
PANY, a corporation; ZION'S
CO-OPERATIVE MERCANTILE
INSTITUTION,
Defendants and Respondents,
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, and LOIS
GREENWOOD, doing business as
LOIS GREENWOOD,
Defendants.

CASE No. 7418

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The 'P·arties will be designated as follows: plaintiff
and appellant will be referred to as appellant; defendant8
and respondents, Standard Furniture Company, a corporation, and Zion's Co-operative :Mercantile Institution,
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will be referred to as respondents. The defendant, Zion's
Savings Bank and Trust Company and Lois Greenwood,
will be referred to merely as defendants.
All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant, on the 23rd of December, 1947 at 3:30 in
the afternoon, was walking westward on the south side
of South Temple Street. She was at that time accompanied by her four small children; three children were
walking at her side and she carried her daughter Gloria,
who was two years of age, in her arms. As she reached
the west side of the driveway which enters into the
rear of the Standard Furniture Company and Zion's
Co-operative Mercantile Institution from South Temple
Street she looked into the driveway and onto the street
and then crossed over the driveway. As she reached
the west side she caught her foot on a 'perpendicular
ledge at the western edge of the driveway to the rear
of the aforementioned business houses. At the point
appellant caught her foot the driveway was about one
and one-half inches lower than the City sidewalk immediately to the west. Mrs. Basinger fell forward
heavily and as she fell she threw her daughter ahead
of her so as not to fall on her and caught the full weight
of her fall on her arms, shoulders and hands. Appellant
suffered severe injuries to the muscles, ligaments and
soft tissues of her shoulders, arms, back and neck. Ever
since the accident appellant has suffered continuous dis-
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ability. The disability wa8 total for some time after
her injuries and had progressively decreased to the
time of trial, but eYen then she could not accomplish
the usual and ordinary \York of taking- care of her family
and her house,York.
The case came on for trial on the 30th of J nne,
1949 before the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr. At the close
of appellant's ease all of the defendants made motion~
for nonsuit. The motions on part of each and every
defendant were granted. The grounds for said rule was
different as to the defendants, Zion's Savings Bank and
Trust Company and Lois Greenwood. As to those defendants the basis of the court's ruling was that the
evidence did not show that either the bank or Lois
Greenwood ever used the driveway from South Temple
Street into the rear of the Standard Furniture Company
and Zion's :Mercantile Institution. From those rulings
the appellant does not appeal. The Court, however,
nonsuited plaintiff as to the defendants who are respondents in this action on different grounds, and fron1
his ruling this appeal is prosecuted.
The evidence demonstrated conclusively and without
any conflict that there was a definite perpendicular ledge
at the point where appellant fell which extended several
feet along the western side of the driveway into the

-:>"

rear of Standard Furniture and Zion's Co-operative
:Mercantile Institution. Photographs of the ledge were
introduced in evidence as exhibits. The photographs
show the ledge as it appeared on the day that appellant
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fell.

They also show that the point where appellant

fell was a low point in the driveway. These exhibits
are marked as Exhibit ''A'', '' B' ', and '' 1' '.
The manager of the

z.c.M:.I.

Tea Room, Sibyl

Watts, testified that the mercantile institute received
deliveries from delivery trucks through the Standard
Furniture driveway and such deliveries averaged five
or six a day. The trash and garbage was also removed
from the back door of the tea room through the driveway,
and that this use by Z.C.M.I. had continued for at least
nine years to the witness's own knowledge. (R. 170-1-2).
Witness Smith testified that he had observed the
respondent, Standard Furniture Com pany, using the
1

driveway into the rear of their store for fifteen or twenty
years and that he had also seen Sunfreeze delivery
wagons go through the driveway to Z.C.M.I. (R. 200).
He also testified that the vehicles he observed going
into Standard Furniture Company were big furniture
van trucks. (R. 201).
Witness Armstrong, manager of Standard Furniture
Company, testified that the Standard Furniture Company had been in operation since November 9, 1909 and
that ever since that time they had used the driveway
and that their trucks and several other trucks not belonging to them had used it. At the time of trial the
Standard Furniture Company had six trucks, two of
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which were eab-nYer Yan~ of a ton and a half dt>::-;ignated
tonnage. Armstrong te~tified further that the use had
been constant oYer the twent:· year~ of his as::-;ociation
with Standard Furniture, the exact use depending- on
the amount of busines~ transacted and tlw nmnber of
trucks which the Standard Furniture Company ownetl
(R. ~03-6). It was Armstrong's judgment that there
would be fifty different trucks using the drive·way serYing the respondent Z.CJ\tl. 's Tea Room and the Standard Furniture Company business. Armstrong also testified on cross-examination by :Mr. Christensen, counsel
for Standard Furniture Company, that the low point
in the driveway had existed for as many years as he

could remember and that as far as he knew during the
twenty years of his association with Standard Furniture
Company the driveway appeared as it is shown in
Exhibit "A" (R. 211, 212). He further testified that
Standard Furniture Company had made no effort whatsoever to correct the condition in the driveway.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. That there was sufficient substantial evidence

from \vhich a jury could find the respondents were both
negligent and that their negligence was the proximate
cause of appellant's injury and therefore the orders of
the court granting respondents' motions for nonsuit
were erroneous, depriving appellant of her right to a
jury trial.
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SUMMARY OF

ARGU~fENT

POINT I.
THERE

I:S

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

THAT RE-

SPONDENTS PUT THE SIDEWALK TO AN UNUSUAL AND
EXTRAORDINARY USE WHICH CAUSED THE DEFECT
FROM WHICH APPELLANT RE·CEIVED HER INJURIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE

IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT RE-

SPONDENTS PUT THE SIDEWALK TO AN UNUSUAL AND
EXTRAORDINARY USE WHICH CAUSED THE DEFECT
FROM WHICH APPELLANT RECEIVED HER INJURIES.

The Exhibits A, B, and 1, show that the poin.t
where the driveway was sunk below the adjoining sidewalk was a short portion of the driveway. They show
that the cement block which was in the driveway was
cracked and broken in an easterly-westerly direction.
The pictures also show that the southernmost edge of
the driveway and sidewalk are level with one another.
From this evidence the jury might well find that the
extraordinary use which had been imposed on the sidewalk by the res'Pondents was the cause of the breaking
of the . cement blocks and the ledge along the western
edge of the driveway. The pictures themselves might
well be the basis for an inference that some extra-
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ordinarily heayy use other than pedestrian and ordinary
foot traYel on the sidewalk caused thP breaking of the
cement slab in the driYeway and the lowering of the
driveway below the edge of the sidewalk to the west
and in this way created the ledge which caused appellant
to suffer her fall and injuries. The law of unusual and
extraordinary uses of public sidewalks "·as thoroughly
discussed by this court in the case of Salt Lake City v.
William Schnbach, et al., 108 Utah 266, 159 P. 2d 149,
160 A.L.R. 809, 815, 819. There this court held that
the person who put a public sidewalk to an extraordinary
use is responsible for the maintenance, repair and upkeep
of the sidewalk at the plaee where his unusual and extraordinary use occurs. The Schubach case places the
liability for injuries to users of the sidewalk on the
party negligent who creates or maintains a dangerous
situation and whose failure to maintain the thing he
has used for his own benefit or purpos~ causes the
accident. The evidence in the ;present case clearly shows
that both Standard Furniture Company and Z.C.~LI.
put the public sidewalk to an extraordinary and unusual
use, and the evidence is without conflict that the defect
in the sidewalk had existed for a long time and that
no attempt to repair or alleviate the defect had been
made by either respondent.
The question of whether or not a defect is such a8
would constitute a dangerous and unsafe condition in the
sidewalk is a question of fact which must be determined
by a jury. In the case of Ray v. Salt Lake City, 92 Utah
412, 69 P. 2d 256, 119 A.L.R. 153, the actual differences
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in elevations of adjoining sections of sidewalks ·was from
three-quarters to seven-eighths of an inch on the north
side and one-quarter to three-eighths of an inch on the
south side. The Utah Court held that this elevation
was sufficient to make a jury question of whether or
not this elevation constituted a danger. The court stated
its position in the following discussion:

'' * * * This court in discussing the rna tter in
the case of Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah,
320, 159 P. 530, 533, refused to follow what
was then recognized as the numerical weight of
authority, and followed what appears to be the
only course that could be followed. It was there
said: 'This court is firmly committed to the
doctrine that ordinarily the question of whether
the maintenance of a particular defect in a
street or sidewalk constitutes negligence on the
part of the municipality is a question of fact
for the jury.'
"The following cases are cited: Jones v.
Ogden City, 32 Utah, 221, 89 P. 1006; Bills v.
Salt Lake City, 37 Utah, 507, 109 P. 745; Robinson
v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah, 497, 121 P. 968; Sweet
v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah, 306, 134 P. 1167."
The Salt Lake City v.. Schubach case, supra, sets
forth the general principles applicable to the case at
bar. There the owner of the abutting property constructed in the sidewalk an entrance to his basement,
the entrance being covered by iron or steel doors. The
steel doors became out of repair and a pedestrian was
injured. The pedestrian sued Salt Lake City, recovered
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judgment ag·ain~t it and ~alt Lake Cit~· brought thP
aetion here disen~sPd again~t the tenant and abutting
o"·ner of the 'property for who~p rouYenielH'P the entrance way was constructed. Thi~ eourt held that the
owner of the land ''"a~ liable to the City for the amount
of recovery by the pedestrian and statPd tlw applicabh·
principles in the following language:
''The ultimate liability i~ upon the author or
continuer of the nuisance. 'Vhen the owner installs such passageways, vaults or coal holes, it
is presumably done for the benefit of his property. 'Neither the public or other individuah;
can derive any possible advantage frmn such a
use of the sidewalk, but it is solely for the defendant's benefit, and he must see to it that he
does not endanger the safety of others, and that
he incommodes the public as little as possible.' ''
The general principle set down was that any person
who makes use of the public sidewalk for his own benefits, using it in an unusual or extraordinary manner,
must exercise care that pedestrians are not endangered
by the extraordinary use made of the sidewalk. The
court set forth the principles succinctly in the following
language:

" * * * Clearly enough, as to the person injured the liability rests upon the party negligent,
the party who creates, or maintains a dangerous
situation, whose failure to maintain the thing he
is using for his own benefit or purpose causes
the accident.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Many cases on facts similar to the Salt Lake City v.
Schubach, supra, case have been decided where entrance
ways, skylights and other unusual uses have been made
of public sidewalks to benefit the adjacent property
owners. A leading case in California on the matter is
M onsch v. Pellissier, 187 Cal. 790, 204 P. 224. There the
use made of the sidewalk was for the purpose of supplying light to defendant's basement. The skylight was
allowed to get broken and out of repair. The California
court applied the principles set forth in Salt Lake City
v. Schubach, supra, and arrived at the conclusion that
the person suffering injuries as a result of the failure
of the owner of the abutting property was entitled to
recover against the abutter. A later California case
applying the same reasoning to a use by an abutting
owner of the sidewalk for a driveway is Granucci v.
Claasen, 204 Cal. 509, 269 P. 437, 59 A.L.R. 435, 43H.
The abutting owner constructed a driveway out of
planks superimposed on the sidewalk in front of his
premises. A spike in one of the vlanks became loose
and plaintiff stumbled on the spike and suffered personal
injuries. The California court citing M onsch v. Pellissier,
supra, as authority held that the use of the sidewalk
for a driveway was an unusual and extraordinary use
and stated the duties imposed on the user in the following language :
"This driveway having been thus constructed
and used not 1p.rimarily for sidewalk purposes
but for the benefit and convenience of the said
defendants in connection with their adjacent
property, and which use was one which was
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independent of and apart from the ordinary and
accustomed use for which sidewalks are designed,
the duty was cast by law upon the defendants to
exercise reasonable care and diligence in the
keeping of said driveway at the point where it
was superimposed upon said sidewalk in a
proper and safe condition for the passage of
pedestrians rightfully using said sidewalk and
said driveway superimposed by defendants thereon. ~Ionsch v. Pellissier, 187 Cal. 792, 204 Pac.
224; Du Val v. Boos Bros. Cafeteria Co., 45 Cal.
App. 383, 187 Pac. 767; 20 R. C. L. p. 77, Sec.
68; 13 R. C. L. p. 320; Grand Forks v. Paulsness,
19 N. D. 293, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1158, 123 N. W.
878; Ryder v. Kinsey, 62 Minn. 85, 34 L.R.A.
557, 54 Am. St. Rep. 623, 64 N. W. 94; Mullen
v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567, 15 Am. Rep. 530; Gray
v. Boston Gaslight Co. 114 Mass. 149, 19 Am. Rep.
324. The duty which was thus cast upon the
defendant Mary J. Claasen, as owner of said
premises, continued during the entire period of
the presence and use of said driveway in connection therewith and said defendant could not relieve herself of such duty either by leasing the
same to her codefendant or by contracting with
him by the terms of said lease for the keeping
of said premises and said driveway in a proper
state of repair."
The uses to which the defendants had put the public
sidewalk were almost the same use to which respondents
had put the sidewalk to in the present case. The court
describing the use stated as follows:
''From the evidence as thus far presented it
appears conclusively, for the p~rposes o.f this
appeal, that the said driveway at the point where
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the plaint~_ff tripped and fell upon it was in a
state of disrepair, which, if imputable to the
negligence of said defendants, would suffice to
entitle this plaintiff to maintain her action. ThP
undisputed evidence disclosed that said driveway
during the ten years of its existence, with the
exception of a brief intermission, had been used
and passed over daily by more or less heay~·
trucks and horsedrawn vehicles in connection
with the use of said premises as a brewery and
later as a coffee mill. During that entire period,
according to the testimony both of the owner of
said premises and of her son, the lessee thereof,
the driveway had never been subjected to any
sort of repair."
The California court treated the use of the sidewalk as
a driveway into the premises of the abutting owner
in exactly the same ·way as it treated the use of
the sidewalk for a light well and other similar uses
made by abutting owners of public sidewalks, and saw
no difference between the different types of uses. Certainly all of the uses are unusual and extraordinary uses
of the public sidewalk. In Gramteci v. Claasen, supr3,
the court stated:

'' * " * since the portion of said sidewalk upon
which the defendants' driveway was superimposed
was being used by said defendants, not as a sidewalk nor primarily for the use and convenience
of the general public, but that the same had been
constructed and was being used by the defendants primarily as a driveway into their said
premises and for their private use, convenience
and benefit. To such a state of facts the decision
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of this court in the case of M:onsch v. Pellissier,
supra, has direct application.''
.A!ppellant has discovered a number of cases covering unusual uses of public sidewalks and has been
unable to find any case where it has not been held that
the person putting the sidewalk to an unusual use is
charged with the responsibility for injuries incurred
when the use renders the sidewalk dangerous and unsafe
for pedestrian travel. There are a number of cases
which hold that using the public sidewalk as a driveway
is an unusual and extraordinary use. These case·s hold
that the active negligence of the user of the public
sidewalk is the basis upon which recovery should be
based by the pedestrian suffering injury. A case setting
forth the basic principle of law covering this is Davis v.

Tallon, et al., 96 N.J.L. 618, 103 Atl. 236, 237. The court
stated the principles upon which the user of the sidewalk was held liable to a pedestrian for injuries created
by the use of the sidewalk in unmistakable language:

" * * * The plaintiff's case was not rested
upon any legal obligation of the owner to keep
the sidewalk in repair, but upon the claim that
defendants, by subjecting the sidewalk to a use
· not intended, that of use by ordinary 1pedestrians,
created a nuisance which rendered them liable
for injuries to persons lawfully using it. The
case was submitted to the jury on this theory,
who found for the plaintiff against the owners,
and awarded her $100, and in favor of the defendant Schreiber."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the court holding that the broken condition of the flagstones of the sidewalk ·where the defendant had used it
for egress and ingress to its premises would give raise
to an inference that the defect was caused by such use,
stated:

'' • * * With the broken condition of the
flagstones existing, subject to the inference that
the condition was caused by using the sidewalk
for the passage of heavy carts from the street
to the lot by prior tenants with the knowledge
and implied participation therein by the owners,
and the testimony of the defendant Schreiber that
the flagstones were not broken by him, the jury
might infer that the nuisance was created by
the act of former tenants, and not by Schreiber,
but his exoneration would not discharge the
owners from liability for the acts of their other
tenants in which they participated. Three causes
of action are set out in the complaint: First
that the owners negligently used the sidewalk
so that it became dangerous, by which neglect
the plaintiff was injured; and second, that the
owners, for their own convenience and that of
their lessees, created and maintained this dangerous condition. On one or the other of these
causes the jury found, as they properly might,
against the owners.''
Zak v.. Craig, 5 N.J. Misc. R. 275, 136 Atl. 410, 411,
is a later New Jersey case applying the principles of
the Davis case to use by trucks. The ingress and egress
there was into a garage which opened upon the public
highway. The defendant argued that there was no legal
duty on the part of the defendant to keep and repair
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the sidewalk and that the defendant wa~ not responsible
for the acts of tenants on her property. The court
affirming a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum
of $3,000.00 stated the theory of liability as follows:
·'The theory upon which the liability of the
defendant was submitted to the jury was the
maintenance of a nuisance in the public highway.
There was 'Plenary proof that the sidewalk did
not become defective and unsafe from the ordinary use thereof by the general public, but it
became broken up as the result of a use for ,,~hich
it was not normally designed, namely, the passage
of heavy motor trucks over it to and from the
defendant's garage, leased to tenants, for the
storing of motor trucks, and in which use the
flagstones were broken, and a hole seven inches
in diameter and six inches in depth was made
in the sidewalk, making it unsafe and dangerous
to the public having occasion to use it. The condition of the sidewalk constituted a public nuisance. The only question in the case was whether
there was any evidence tending to establish that
the defendant caused or maintained the nuisance.''
Further enlarging upon the inferences that could be
drawn from the fact of dam~ge to the sidewalk at the
point where the extraordinary use was imposed upon
it, the court stated what we consider to be an applicable
rprinci ple :
''There was also testimony in the case which
tended to show that, at the time of the expiration
of the lease to the grocery company and the renewal thereof to it, such renewal impliedly arising from the fact that the defendant permitted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the grocery company to remain as tenant, the
hole in the sidewalk existed and the flagstones
were broken, and hence, as this condition constituted a nuisance, and did not have its origin
from the ordinary wear and tear of a sidewalk,
resulting from a normal use by the public, but,
according to the testimony, was created by the
extraordinary strain put upon the sidewalk by
the tenants of the defendant, who were authorized by her to use the premises for a purpose
which caused the sidewalk to be subjected to
unusual pressure and strain, and for which use
the sidewalk was not designed, that is, for motor
trucks or other heavy vehicles to be driven over
it, the defendant became answerable to respond
to the plaintiff in damages for the injuries she
sustained.
''The motions for a nonsuit and for the direction of a verdict for the defendant were properly
refused.''
Other jurisdictions having passed upon the same
proposition have reached like conclusions. An important
case directly in point in the present suit is Mullins v.
Siegel-Cooper Co., 95 App. Div. 234, 88 N.Y. Supp. 737,
739, affirmed 183 N.Y. 129, 75 N.E. 1112. There the
defendant crossed over the sidewalk into a lane leading
to his place of business. The cross-over on the sidewalk
was used by wagons hauling loads of stones and building
materials into defendant's property and ,,·as also used
by wagons hauling manure out of the defendant's stables,
the use creating a defect in the side·walk upon which
plaintiff stumbled and suffered her injuries. The New
York courts, a'pplying the principles that the person
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creating a defect in the sidewalk by his unusual aud
extraordinary use thereof will be held responsible for
reasonable eare to ~t>e that the ~ide\\·alk i~ not rendered
unsafe or dangerous, held the defendant liable to the
plaintiff for the injuries which ::;he receiYed when she
fell. They also went on to set dm:vn a principle which
the California courts in the Granucci case, supra, applied,
namely, that there is no difference between the use of
the public sidewalks for grates, coal chutes, etc., and a
use of the side·walk for a driYe\vay, stating:
'' \Y e discover no difference in principle between this case and those dealing vYith grates,
coal chutes, or holes in sidewalks. Such openings
in the sidewalk are put there for the advantage
of the owners, and for the benefit of the property.
In the case at bar the stone was drawn in upon
the premises of defendant for the purpose of
building a wall to enhance the value of the property, and for the use and convenience of the
defendant. It subjected the sidewalk in front of
this lane to a use other than that involved in the
right of the public to use the sidewalk, and was
purely its own. No question arises that such
use was unauthorized, for one may have access
from his premises to the public street, even
though he must cross the sidewalk; but under
the doctrine we have cited, and under the maxim,
'So use your own property as not to injure the
rights of another,' we believe that, as the injury
to the walk was primarily caused by the drawing
of the stone, and was enhanced by subsequent
private use of the defendant, or for its benefit,
it was liable for the result of the improper condition. The accident occurred several months after
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the sidewalk was first put into this unsafe condition, which grew steadily worse.''
See also: City of Topeka v. Cent-ral Sash & Door Co., 97
Kan. 49, 154 P. 232.
None of the cases above cited have been particularly
concerned ·with a statute but, of cour~e, statutory language fixing liabilities and duties of users of the public
sidewalks would be helpful.
Section 36-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, sets forth
the general duties of persons who encroach upon the
sidewalks. The section reads as follows:

"SIDEWALKS-Encroachments by or onPorches, Flumes, Pvpes. It shall be unlawful to
extend or construct any sidewalk so as to encroach
upon any highway nearer to the center thereof
than the curb line, or to encroach upon any sidewalk with any building, fence, wall, post or other
thing nearer than the fence line, or so as to make
the sidewalk narrower than the widths herein
designated; and all platforms, porches or other
similar things on sidewalks shall be at the grade
thereof, and flumes, pipes or other similar things
below the grade shall be covered to grade, and
shall be kep.t in good repair by the person in
whose interest constructed so as not to be dangerous to pedestrians or to impair the safe and
ordinary use of the highway.''
While the above quoted statute does not specifically
mention roadways or driveways over the sidewalk it
sets down a general principle which would be a·pplicable
to such encroachments.
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From the quoted eases and the statutory law of
Utah it appears that respondents who were making an
extraordinary use of the sidewalk in front of the Standard Furniture driveway incurred a duty to keep in
repair the sidewalk at that point. This duty they failed
to perfonn and as a result appellant suffered injuries.
On every factual matter there was substantial evidence
from which a jury could have resolved all the issues in
appellant's favor, and the court erred in nonsuiting
plaintiff.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 'H
order nonsuiting appellant as against respondents,
Standard Furniture Company and Zion's Co-operative
l\fercantile Institution, was erroneous and contrary to
law, there being substantial evidence on all issues presented and if said order is allowed to stand it will deprive
plaintiff of her right to a jury trial; that said order
should be set aside and appellant granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
DWIGHT L. KING and

WAYNE L. BLACK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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